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constructing a new database from 27 household surveys in 10 countries. 
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saving. This fact, coupled with the discrepancy with national accounts 
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Introduction 
 
An extensive literature has examined the aggregate determinants of the 
private saving rate around the globe and in Latin America in particular 
(see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven, 2000, and IDB, 2013). This active 
field of research, while having enriched the understanding of this complex 
and vital economic outcome, falls short of being bulletproof. By its very 
nature, macroeconomic variables cannot accurately inform about the 
ultimate factors behind why and how much households save.1 
 
However, despite the apparent advantages of the microdata approach, 
little was known until very recently about household saving decisions in 
Latin America. Among the handful of existing contributions, we can 
mention Butelmann and Gallego (2000) for Chile and Sandoval-
Hernandez (2013) for Mexico and Gandelman (2014a,b) for nine 
economies in the region. Attanasio and Szekely (2000) construct synthetic 
cohorts to compare household saving behavior between two Latin 
American countries (Peru and Mexico) and two East Asian economies 
(Thailand and Taiwan).  
 
To broaden our knowledge about this subject, the present study exploits 
household-level data from Latin American national surveys on income 
and expenditure. At the end of the day, the goal is to pinpoint 
socioeconomic and other factors that may constrain the ability of Latin 
American households to save as well as drawing policy 
recommendations. Given the stated scope of our research, the main 
                                                 
1 A given macroeconomic regressor may lend itself to more than just one interpretation. 
For example, the real interest rate is thought to capture intertemporal substitution effects, 
but may also proxy for aggregate risk and for the degree of financial development, 
blurring any meaningful inference from the empirical findings. 
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contribution does not lie in methodological innovations but largely in 
conducting a comprehensive cross-country saving analysis for the Latin 
American region, covering ten economies and twenty-seven surveys in 
selected years for the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.  
 
Our approach consists of pooling household-level data from all those 
surveys, adding country and time effects, for a total number of about 
392,000 usable observations. This implies that we will not pay much 
attention to individual country- and time-specific saving behavior, a 
choice justified by (i) the practical difficulty to present and assess in a 
reader-friendly way evidence from such a large set of countries and years; 
and (ii) the fact that Gandelman (2014a,b) undertakes, for a similar 
dataset, a country-by-country descriptive, but not econometric, analysis of 
a some major issues tackled in our paper.  
 
The paper is organized in three sections. Section 1 briefly reviews the 
theoretical support for the subsequent empirical analysis of household 
saving decisions. Section 2 describes the data and Section 3 presents the 
econometric results. A closing section discusses the conclusions and 
policy implications. 
 
1. Literature Review 
 
This section sets the groundwork for the statistical assessment of the 
various drivers of the household saving rate. As standard in this field, we 
will frame our analysis within the canonical permanent income 
(Friedman, 1957) and the life cycle (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954) 
models. While these models have forcefully posited the intertemporal 
smoothing motive for consumption, subsequent refinements highlighted 
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the major role played by borrowing constraints (see Campbell and 
Mankiw, 1990, and Deaton, 1991) and precaution in the face of uncertainty 
(see Kimball, 1990, and Lusardi, 1998) in shaping consumption and saving 
decisions. Our regressors are conventional empirical counterparties for 
the theoretical drivers underlying the above theories. In what follows, we 
list and discuss the proposed list of explanatory variables and succinctly 
summarize the available evidence for Latin America. 
 
Household head education qualifies as a reasonable proxy for expected 
future income. Within the permanent income formulation, the saving rate 
should not be responsive to permanent income but to gaps between 
current and permanent income. Nevertheless, schooling levels may have a 
bearing on saving on its own, as educated individuals may display a 
lower time preference (more patience), and so a clearer inclination to save 
– in fact, the very decision to study and delay the entry into the labor force 
reveals such kind of pro-saving behavior. Gandelman (2014b), for a 
number of economies in the region, Sandoval-Hernandez (2013), for 
Mexico, and Butelmann and Gallego (2001), for Chile, find mixed 
evidence regarding the education-saving nexus, with several countries 
and years where the household saving rate drops with educational levels.  
 
In order to further investigate wealth effects on consumption, a house 
ownership dummy variable will be included in the analysis (see Peltonen, 
Sousa and Vansteenkiste, 2009, and Butelmann and Gallego, 2001, who 
both find a positive effect). Home ownership, though, lends itself to 
several and conflicting effects on saving, namely: (i) Once having become 
home owners, households may diminish their saving vis-à-vis non-home 
owners. Securing a roof and getting rid of a monthly rent may induce 
households to save less, especially if they do not have an outstanding 
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mortgage on the property; (b) Having saved for some time to buy, as 
opposed to renting, hints at a frugal attitude by household members and a 
higher saving rate; and (c) Real state can serve as collateral when tapping 
the credit market, and thus may loosen financial constraints and then the 
household’s saving effort.  
 
Two contrasting views have been put forward in the pension and saving 
literature (see Engen and Gale, 1999). On the one hand, under the standard 
life cycle model, compulsory social security contributions substitute for 
voluntary saving. If the anticipated pension benefits are comparable to the 
gross return of voluntary saving, pension system participation should not 
change permanent income, and thus neither should change saving 
decisions. On the other hand, social security membership may increase 
saving for myopic individuals who do not abide by the permanent income 
consumption rule and, as a result, do not save at all (or enough) on their 
own to provide for retirement.  A dummy variable will capture this effect, 
distinguishing contributing from non-contributing workers.2 
Compounding this theoretical ambiguity, a modified life cycle approach 
would add new and disparate arguments: (i) If faced with borrowing 
constraints, individuals may not be able to increase consumption in 
response to the inception of a pension system; (ii) If an early retirement 
option is open to the worker, he/she may decide to save more to finance a 
longer retirement period; and (iii) If pension benefits resolve the 
uncertainty linked to earnings and longevity risk, voluntary saving for 
precautionary reasons may fall. Yet, if the pension system –be it public or 
private- suffers from a lack of credibility –workers are uncertain as to 
whether they will actually receive, once retired, the benefits he/she is 
                                                 
2 Unfortunately, for countries having both systems in place, household surveys do not 
inquire about the regime (pay-as-you-go or capitalization) the worker contributes to. 
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entitled to-, this last effect may be partly neutralized. 
 
A most sensitive issue in running a household saving regression is 
whether current income should be included within the set of explanatory 
variables. In the face of solid international evidence of a high correlation 
between current income and saving rates (see Bozio et al., 2011), many 
authors claim that current income is an endogenous variable and hence 
that the estimated coefficient would be biased upward, overstating the 
intrinsic saving-income link (see Attanasio, 1994, and Dynan, Skinner and 
Zeldes, 2004). They usually invoke two reasons: (i) Consumption 
smoothing implies a positive correlation between current income and 
saving rates due to transitory shocks (people compensate for temporarily 
high (low) income with more (less) saving and vice versa); and (ii) 
Measurement error in income will translate into measurement error of the 
same sign in saving (since income appears on both sides of the equation). 
In order to circumvent these pitfalls, empirical studies have either deleted 
current income from the regressors list or have instrumented it with 
proxies for permanent income, such as education or consumption. By 
applying the latter approach, a number of papers have confirmed that the 
rich do in general save more than the poor (see, among others, Dynan, 
Skinner and Zeldes, 2004, for the US, and Gandelman, 2014b, for several 
Latin American countries).  
 
In spite of such sound arguments, there are still some compelling reasons 
for not writing off the saving-current income link as economically 
meaningless, namely: (a) At odds with the permanent income theory, 
current income may indeed be a major driver of consumption and saving 
for financially constrained or myopic individuals (see for example 
Campbell and Mankiw, 1990); (b) Higher current income may also be 
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associated to higher saving rates under Stone-Geary preferences -and thus 
a subsistence income threshold beyond which saving takes place- or as 
postulated in the neo-Keynesian models of Lewis, Kaldor and Pasinetti –
where entrepreneurs save but workers do not- (see Ogaki, Ostry and 
Reinhart, 1996, Schmidt-Hebbel, 2000, and Achury, Hubar and 
Koulovatianos (2012)). Along these lines, in the macro field, empirical 
research has identified the level of per capita GDP as a significant 
explanatory variable (see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén, 2000); (c) 
Unfortunately, measurement errors and transitory income shocks are not 
directly observable, so there is no clarity as to the actual size of the 
coefficient bias. Relatedly, the above endogeneity argument assumes that 
income and expenditure measurement errors are independent of each 
other, which is an empirical matter;3 (d) If current income turns out to be a 
relevant regressor, its exclusion on the grounds of endogeneity bias would 
give rise to a different sort of endogeneity bias, that is, omitted variable 
bias. For instance, it is well-known that the age-income and the education-
income profiles are increasing up to some point. By excluding current 
income, the age and education coefficients may be overestimated; and (e) 
Last but not least, policy prescriptions can be quite different. If one 
believes that saving decisions have more to do with permanent than 
current income, saving policy measures affecting the former (but not 
necessarily the latter) -like fostering education levels, reducing interest 
rates or infusing optimism on economic prospects- would raise the 
                                                 
3 Similarly, as opposed to current income, permanent income is also unobservable, as it 
encompasses discounted expected flows of income. In this light, it is difficult to ascertain 
how good a proxy education or other variables are. For instance, on top of being 
unobservable, perceptions of permanent income can be time-varying (see Heymann, 
2007), while most standard proxies are time-invariant. On a related note, measurement 
error stems from the fact that Y (income) is part of the residual measurement of saving as 
Y-C, where C is consumption expenditure. However, if the saving rate is defined as (Y-
C)/Y, the direction and size of the bias becomes even less clear. Defining the saving rate 
as (Y-C)/C overcomes such an ambiguity. 
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average saving rate. Conversely, the conviction that current income plays 
a leading role would render such advice much less appealing. In light of 
the above controversy, the subsequent econometric work will take a step 
back and revisit this issue by running and comparing specifications 
involving both current income and an instrumental variable, as well as 
excluding income. 
 
As put forward by the life cycle model, the saving rate should be highest 
among working adults vis-à-vis individuals at both tails of the age 
distribution. Since the nexus between saving and age is likely to be 
concave, age and age squared will enter the equation. Likewise, the old 
dependency ratio (individuals aged 65 and older to those between 15 and 
64 years old) and the young dependency ratio (individuals under 15 to 
those between 15 and 64 years old) will be part of the control set. The 
evidence, nevertheless, is not utterly conclusive regarding this prediction. 
For instance, Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) do not find evidence of 
dissaving among the elderly in the US, and neither does World Bank 
(2011) for Brazil. Gandelman (2014a) observes that household heads above 
60 display higher saving rates than those aged 40-49 in several Latin 
American countries. Similar finding is shown for Mexico by Sandoval-
Hernandez (2013) for a number of surveys in the 1984-2010 period.  
 
An extended version of the very life cycle model can accommodate this 
factual ambiguity, by incorporating longevity and health risks as well as 
bequest motives among the elderly. In turn, Mody, Ohnsorge and Sandri 
(2012) argue that the young dependency ratio may not decrease but 
increase the saving rate whenever parents seek to build a buffer stock to 
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provide for future education and health expenditures for their children.4 
All in all, the issue must be settled on empirical grounds. 
 
By stifling the ability to finance a wedge between desired current 
consumption and income, borrowing constraints may increase the 
household saving rate. The presence of financial constraints is not easily 
observable, but some insight can be gained by noticing that people with 
access to formal lending (including credit cards) or to income sources 
other than salaries and transfers (such as remittances or rents) are a priori 
less likely to suffer such constraints. The estimates produced by Sandoval-
Hernandez (2013) with Mexican data lend support to the above claims, 
while Butelmann and Gallego (2001) report conflicting findings for 
different Chilean survey years. 
 
Precautionary saving may appear whenever households decide to build a 
buffer stock to face a more volatile income in the future (for a given 
expected future income). Among other possible proxies, self-employment 
is a priori associated to larger income risk. The reception of government 
transfers (such as subsidies and pensions) as well as remittances from 
relatives and friends living overseas would have the opposite effect. 
Household location may also have to do with saving behavior in this 
regard. As claimed, among others, by Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and 
Serven (2000), urban households may have a lower saving rate, as 
consumption opportunities are much broader and accessible than in rural 
areas. Also, income risks in rural areas are not as diversifiable as in big 
cities, which may induce a higher saving rate in the former than in the 
                                                 
4 Gandelman (2014b) argues that just looking at the age of the household heads, as 
customary in most studies, and not at that of other income-earning members may distort 
the analysis of the age-saving relationship. 
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latter. Sandoval-Hernandez (2013) obtains results consistent with this 
hypothesis.  
 
Other frictions can hinder the saving process. For example, the above 
theories take as granted the access to financial instruments meeting the 
needs of households with desired positive saving. This is not always the 
case. For instance, rural families or those living in marginal areas may not 
have easy access to bank facilities, a major impediment at the time of 
investing their saving. To test this aspect, a dummy with value 1 for rural 
families and for those who report possessing a bank account will be 
incorporated on the right-hand side. 
 
Let us notice that the effect of some regressors may be conditioned by 
some other variables in the control set, a feature that can be fruitfully 
addressed via interaction terms. In particular, we are interested in the 
joint effects of the dependency ratio, the education level and the age of the 
household head with household income level. 
 
To close this section, in light of the variety of theoretical and empirical 
effects described above, the overall reading of the literature provides, with 
few exceptions, little guidance as to what to expect from our estimations.   
 
2. Data 
 
This section describes the main trends in the saving rate and its main 
correlates across the available national household surveys. The SEDLAC 
database, administered by CEDLAS (Centro de Estudios Distributivos, 
Laborales y Sociales) is the most comprehensive source of household 
survey data for LAC countries. However, to date, household survey 
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collection and analysis around the world has placed the largest effort on 
the income modules vis-à-vis the expenditure side.5 That being said, we 
have put together a new and homogeneous database merging 
expenditure and other socioeconomic household characteristics for ten 
Latin American countries spanning selected years since the 1990s, 
comprising the following twenty-seven household surveys:  
 
Table 2.1 
Household Survey Coverage 
 
 
This list is dictated by the quest for broad regional coverage (countries in 
South, Central and North America), economic development heterogeneity 
and time variation. As it is obvious, data availability proves to be a major 
constraint, as expenditure surveys do not exist for several countries or are 
not conducted on an annual basis. 
                                                 
5 Incidentally, this may explain, as noticed above, the worldwide relative scarcity of 
micro-level research on consumption and saving. 
         Country Years 
 Argentina 2004-2012 
 Brazil 2003-2009 
 Colombia 1997-2003-2011 
 Ecuador       1999-2006 
 El Salvador 1998-2004-2010 
 Guatemala 2000-2006-2011 
 Mexico 1994-2000-2010 
 Nicaragua 1998-2005-2009 
 Panama 1997-2003-2008 
 Peru 1997-2003-2010 
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Our variable of interest is the household saving rate, defined as 
disposable income minus consumption expenditure as a ratio of 
disposable income. Since we are concerned with household decisions, 
disposable income is measured as gross household income (from labor 
and other sources) net of taxes and retirement contributions, the latter 
being subtracted because of their compulsory rather than voluntary 
nature. Besides this standard saving rate, which will be the basis for our 
econometric work, we have calculated the following alternative measures: 
(a) Saving to consumption, which is a monotonic transformation of the 
traditional saving-to-income ratio, but is not affected by low or zero 
income.6; (b) The same saving/income and saving/consumption ratios 
augmented by durables, health and education expenditures. Details on 
methodological and measurement aspects are included in an unreported 
annex available from the authors upon request. 
 
Tables 2.2 to 2.5 show the above four measures for each survey under 
analysis. Each table reports the aggregate rate (sum of saving to sum of 
income or consumption over all households in the survey) as well as the 
mean and the median household saving rate. The values display an 
enormous dispersion across countries, years and measures. Measure-wise, 
the mean is dramatically different from the aggregate rate, while the latter 
lies closer to the median. Mean household saving rates are strongly 
negative in most cases (24 of the 27 surveys). Even medians are negative, 
for the usual saving-to-income measure, in 6 cases. This all points to a 
noteworthy phenomenon: the prevalence of negative saving in a vast 
number of households. According to Table 2.2, an average of 45% of 
                                                 
6 Out of the total number of households in the dataset, just 0.4% reports zero income and 
none negative income. 
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households across the region has negative saving, with a maximum of 
65% (El Salvador 2004) and a minimum of 13% (Guatemala 2000). Since 
negative saving implies a financing gap, these figures call for more 
granular data on financing choices and decisions, which are plainly 
omitted in most national household surveys. As will be seen shortly, just a 
handful of surveys include some questions on the use of banking and 
credit, but even in these cases no questions are asked, when applicable, 
about the excess of expenditures over income, and the ways such deficit is 
taken care of.7  
 
To summarize the information contained in Tables 2.2-2.5, Table 2.6 
shows some statistics on the aggregate saving rate. The regional mean of 
the saving-to-income ratio is 13.1%, which goes up to 29.3% after 
including durables, health and education expenses. The median is quite 
similar (12.7% and 28.1%), but these values hide a significant variation 
across surveys, ranging, for the standard saving rate, from -33% to +63%. 
This range is even more pronounced for the saving/consumption 
measure. 
 
As mentioned earlier, measuring saving by means of household data has, 
unlike national accounts saving, the advantage of providing details on the 
saving behavior and the socioeconomic profile of each interviewed family. 
                                                 
7 Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Verbina (2003) confirm that negative saving rates are 
common among the lower percentiles of the income distribution for a number of 
countries. This issue is not observed solely in Latin America, but also in more developed 
economies. For instance, Alves and Cardoso (2010) points out that 90% of the Portuguese 
household saving is generated by 20% of the households, and that the 30% of total 
households have negative saving rates (-60% of disposable income for the first saving 
decile). For Ireland in 1999/2000, Moreno-Badia (2006) reports a national accounts-based 
household saving rate of 9.4% and a household survey-based value of 3%. Moreover, she 
computes a saving rate of -6% and -2% for the first and second income quartile, which 
rises to 14% for the fourth quartile.  
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But since conventional saving rates are calculated from national accounts 
rather than household surveys, it is convenient to compare them. 
Unfortunately, a large number of countries lack institutional sector 
accounts separating household and business saving. Taking advantage of 
a recent dataset assembled by Bebczuk and Cavallo (2014), Table 2.7 
compares both measures for a small set of countries and years with 
available information. Sizable differences are seen in either direction and 
for several surveys, such as Brazil 2009 (20.3% according to the household 
survey and 4.5% to national accounts) and Mexico 2000 (3.5% and 9.2%).8 
 
Accurately measured, both sources should yield the same results, but this 
is obviously not the case. While discrepancies are admissible, the wedge is 
eye-catching. Ravallion (2000) discusses at length the contrast between 
social indicators measured via household surveys or national accounts. 
Differences can be traced to many factors, inter alia, sample coverage 
(wider for national accounts), data sources (mostly supply-side in national 
accounts and demand-side in surveys), methodology (consumption 
measured as a residual -and thus absorbing any existing measurement 
errors- in national accounts, and directly measured in surveys) and the 
treatment of certain items (imputed rents, own-account consumption, 
financial services, and so on). In addition, a pervasive problem with 
household surveys is the limited coverage of and the income 
underreporting of income by well-off families. In turn, potentially 
misleading saving and consumption data can result from recall 
                                                 
8 Let us say that these differences are not exclusive of Latin America and extend to 
developed countries as well. For instance, NZIER (2007) notices for New Zealand that the 
average household saving rate for 1984-2001 was -7.3% of disposable income according to 
national accounts and +7.5% according to the micro data collected by the Household 
Economic Survey. For the case of Portugal in 2005-2006, Alves and Cardoso (2010) inform 
a household saving rate of 20% based on household surveys and one of 8% as calculated 
in the national accounts.   
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expenditure surveys, such as the ones being exploited here (see Battistin, 
2003, and Browning, Crossley and Winter, 2014).   
 
The underreporting issue is reflected in Table 2.8, where per capita 
consumption is compared between household survey level and its 
national accounts counterpart.9 In all cases, household surveys record a 
smaller per capita consumption, with a difference of between 8% (Panama 
2008) and 63% (El Salvador 2010), and a mean of 40%. This indicates that 
either the sample is tilted towards lower income households and/or that 
there exists a major underreporting bias, which should not be ignored at 
the time of drawing conclusions from the data.  
 
In line with our approach of merging the observations from all surveys 
into a large dataset of some 392,000 households across all countries and 
surveys, we describe next some salient features of the data. Since the 
conclusions are similar based on either denominator (income or 
consumption), the following tables use the standard saving rate. Table 2.9 
portraits the age-income profile of the median saving rate. From the first 
column, it can be noticed that the saving rate increases with age. Even 
though it is somewhat reasonable that households with a young head 
save less than their middle-aged peers, it is more startling that the saving 
rate of older household heads is the highest among all age groups, 
especially for heads aged 71 and up. In turn, the last row of the same 
Table 2.9 shows the median saving rate by income quintile.10 In line with 
                                                 
9 Bhalla (2002) reports, for a broad sample of developing countries in 1998, that the ratio 
of consumption per capita as measured in household surveys to the same variable as 
measured by national accounts amounts to 76.5%. For the industrialized world, this 
number is 63.2%. Per capita income cannot strictly be compared because, in view of the 
lack of institutional sector accounts, national accounts aggregates do not allow to isolate 
household income. 
10 The income quintile corresponds to the one the household pertains to in its own 
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previous evidence, the saving rate is strongly correlated with current 
income, moving from -47.3% for the first quintile to 23.4% for the fifth. 
The positive saving-income shows up at all age groups, while the positive 
saving-age pattern is exclusively explained by the three superior 
quintiles.11 According to Table 2.10, the saving rate grows with the 
education level of the head, with a median saving rate of 6.1% for those 
with primary education going up to 9.1% and 11.9% for those with 
secondary and tertiary education, respectively.  
 
Table 2.12 revisits the apparent saving-income connection by examining 
the saving-expenditure profile. If, as postulated by the permanent income 
theory, household expenditure is less influenced by transitory shocks and 
thus more stable than income, there should be little to no relationship 
between saving and expenditure. Far from that, high expenditure 
households save distinctly less than low expenditure households. The 
asymmetry is most evident when comparing the first and the last 
expenditure quintiles, whose median saving rates are 15.8% and -25.4%, 
respectively. The same pattern is detected not only for the whole sample 
but for each age group as well. This means that measurement errors are 
likely to contaminate both income and expenditure, that is, higher saving 
households might overstate income and/or understate expenditure. In 
turn, the fact that saving rates rise (fall) with income (expenditure) casts 
some doubt about the lack of correlation between income and expenditure 
measurement errors, as assumed in the income endogeneity story 
                                                                                                                                     
country, no in the overall income distribution for the full dataset. 
11 A possible rationale for the increase of the saving rate with age for higher income 
households is the perception among the latter, unlike those pertaining to lower income 
brackets, of an expected upward income trend through their lifetime horizon, coupled 
with a more ostensive bequest motive for saving. This is consistent with the rising saving 
rate with age for heads with secondary and tertiary education, but the opposite for those 
having reached primary education (see Table 2.11). 
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outlined in Section 1. Specifically, if these two errors are negatively 
correlated, as suggested by the previous analysis, the income coefficient 
bias should lessen to some extent.  
 
3. Econometric Results 
 
This section reports and assesses the main econometric findings. After 
pooling all household surveys and adding country and time effects, 
median regressions (see Attanasio, 1993) of the saving rate are run on an 
array of household characteristics. As discussed in Section 1, theory offers 
poor guidance in defining the expected sign on each variable, as 
sometimes contradictory effects can be derived depending on modeling 
assumptions. For the sake of brevity, and building on the conceptual 
arguments already presented in Section 1 and the references therein, the 
present section focuses solely on documenting the new findings.   
 
Regressions can be classified into two groups, one containing the baseline 
specification, and another incorporating to such core estimation a number 
of additional correlates. The baseline results (Table 3.1) were put to and 
passed a number of robustness tests, including keeping only the last 
available survey (Table 3.2), excluding outliers (Table 3.3), keeping only 
the countries usually thought to have the most consistent surveys over 
time (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, Table 3.4), replacing 
the saving/disposable income by the saving/consumption ratio (Table 
3.5), and taking health and education expenses as saving (Table 3.6). 
Furthermore, we instrumented income by education years of the 
household head (Table 3.7) and by home and car ownership (Table 3.8). 
The main results are summarized next:  
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a. Current income presents a positive and significant coefficient 
throughout all regressions. 
b. When instrumented by household head education (see Table 3.4) and 
by house and car ownership (Table 3.5), income remains highly 
significant, albeit the estimate goes down by about half.12 
c. Age has a positive but decreasing effect on saving in our baseline 
regressions.13 However, the age coefficient becomes significantly 
negative when adopting an income-based definition for the 
dependency ratio, deeming this result as fragile. 
d. Households with female heads tend to save less. 
e. The age-defined dependency ratio (total, old and young) bears a 
positive sign when controlling for current income, which turns 
negative for total and young dependency when current income is 
dropped. The old dependency ratio remains positive even after the 
latter change. The same results are found when current income is 
instrumented. Conversely, the income-based dependency ratio 
(dependents to income earners) presents a negative and robust 
estimate all along. 
f. Higher levels of household head education (those with 8-13 and more 
than 13 years of schooling, relative to those with less than 8) diminish 
the saving rate when controlling for income, but increase it otherwise. 
The likely correlation between current income and education may be 
behind this result. A possible interpretation of the negative sign would 
be that, once controlled for current income, highly educated heads 
envisage an upward lifetime income trend, which would boost 
                                                 
12 We try these two different instruments not only for robustness but also because using 
education as an instrument prevents us from assessing the direct effect of education on 
saving. Instrumenting by asset ownership overcomes this issue. 
13 Given that the square of age enters with a negative sign, the first column of Table 3.1 
implies that saving peaks for household heads aged 68. 
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consumption and depress saving.14  
g. The above results are largely invariant to subsampling (by keeping 
only the last available survey for each country and, by doing that, 
cutting down the total sample from some 392,000 to 167,000 
observations –see Table 3.2) and to scaling saving by expenditure 
instead of income (Table 3.5).15 
 
In relation to the core regression augmented with additional variables and 
interaction terms, Tables 3.9 and 3.10 indicate that:16 
 
a. A higher proportion of government transfers and of remittances in 
overall household income reduces the saving rate, revealing that these 
sources of income appear to discourage saving.17 
b. Households with a formal head (meaning that he/she contributes to 
social security) save more. The saving rate also increases for formal 
workers affiliated to capitalization schemes.18,19 Against the 
                                                 
14 The fragility of these and other coefficients cannot be attributed to multicolinearity issues. First, 
multicolinearity may affect the coefficient’s precision (and thus the statistical significance), but not 
revert them to a well-estimated value with the opposite sign. Second, the correlations among these 
baseline regressors are quite low: the median correlation coefficient is -0.004, with a maximum of 
0.31 and a minimum of -0.21.   
15 The main results largely hold in unreported regressions comprising only positive 
saving observations as well as when considering health and education expenses as 
saving. 
16 These variables are entered one by one because of concerns about multicolinearity. Several of 
these additional regressors do indeed lose significance when running the full specification.  
17 Both transfers and remittances are included as part of disposable income, so these 
income sources appear on both sides of the regression, which may bias the estimated 
coefficient upward. Reassuringly, the coefficient turns out to significantly negative. In 
any case, for the whole sample, the correlation with income is very low (0.13 for transfers 
and -4% for remittances). 
18 Since, in countries with a mixed pension model, household surveys do not inform 
about the pension system to which the worker is affiliated, the Capitalization dummy 
takes value 1 for surveys at which time a full capitalization system was in effect. For the 
sample at hand, these surveys are El Salvador (1994, 2004 and 2010) and Mexico (2000 
and 2010). However, even with limitation, it is still possible to distinguish the above full 
capitalization experiences from the rest (PAYG -in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama- 
and hybrid -in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru-). 
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background of studies for advanced countries unveiling a crowding-
out effect between voluntary saving and mandatory pension saving 
(see, for instance, Attanasio and  Brugiavini, 2003, and Attanasio and 
Rohwedder, 2003), this crowding-in effect is consistent with the scarce 
evidence for Latin America (as produced by Sandoval-Hernandez, 
2012, on Mexico, and Coronado, 1998, on Chile).20  
c. Self-employment diminishes the saving rate. 
d. Access to financial instruments also reduces the saving rate. This is 
true for credit instruments (loans) as well as payment (having a bank 
account) and hybrid ones (credit cards). 
e. Homeownership is associated with a higher saving rate. 
f. Urban households save less than rural ones. 
g. The higher the level of health and education expenses, the lower the 
saving rate, implying some degree of offset between standard saving 
and this kind of expenses, thus meaning that the latter are considered a 
form of saving.21 
                                                                                                                                     
19 In principle, when including an interaction variable, all constitutive terms must be 
included as well. Otherwise the estimated coefficients would be biased and inconsistent.  
However, this ceases to be true whenever the effect of one of those terms is nil if the other 
variable is zero (see Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). In the present case, Capitalization 
is a subset of Participation, which implies that when Participation is zero, then 
Capitalization is also zero by construction, warranting the exclusion of Capitalization on 
its own. Reassuringly, when Capitalization is included, this conclusion does not change 
(see columns 4 and 5, Table 3.5a). Incidentally, to claim a positive effect of capitalization 
on saving, we need to consider the joint effect of being formal and contributing to the 
pension fund system (in the regression, the sum of the coefficients on Capitalization and 
Capitalization * Formal). This sum is 0.015 and it was tested to be statistically significant 
at 1%. 
20 Recall that the crowding-out hypothesis assumes that individuals behave according to 
the pure frictionless permanent income model. Departures from such model, such as 
borrowing constraints (limiting the ability to increase consumption) or behavioral traits 
(such as the so-called recognition effect, in the sense of greater awareness of the 
importance of saving for retirement) may give rise to a different effect. 
21 Since health and education expense items appear to be a substitute of conventional 
saving, this lends support to the importance of computing broader measures of saving, as 
proposed in the literature and showed in Section 2 of this document. 
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h. Based on the specifications from Table 3.6, the positive effect of age –
which appears only when controlling for age vis-à-vis income 
dependency- is attenuated at higher income levels. 
i. All forms of the dependency ratio (by age –total, old, and young- and 
by income) display a negative effect but this response weakens as 
income rises.  
j. As income goes up, the effect of education becomes more negative (for 
those with 8-13 years of education) or less positive (for those with 
more than 13 years of education). 
k. The negative effect of education lessens with the age of the household 
head. This is at odds with the prior that young and highly educated 
individuals should be less prone to save, as their income is expected to 
grow more vis-à-vis older individuals with the same education level. 
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This study has investigated the main patterns and drivers of the 
household saving rate in Latin America by exploiting and pooling a broad 
dataset of official household surveys for 10 Latin American countries and 
27 surveys covering selected years from the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. 
 
On the statistical side, we document a wide dispersion of saving rates 
across countries and periods and equally huge differences between 
aggregate, mean and median saving rates. Furthermore, almost half of the 
households display negative saving. Underlying these figures, there is a 
strong suspicion of income underreporting and/or consumption 
overreporting. The apparent gap between household survey and national 
accounts measures of saving and income call for refinements and cross-
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validation of household survey information, so as to turn it into a more 
reliable data source for policy and academic purposes. 
 
Many variables were tested in explaining saving that proved to be 
statistically and economically significant. A number of robustness checks, 
including subsampling as well as outlier exclusion, were conducted and 
passed by most regressors, meaning that signs, point estimates and 
statistical significances were maintained even after radical changes in 
sample size and composition. The estimations highlight the overriding 
positive role of income in shaping saving decisions. This occurs when 
entering current income and also, albeit with a lower but still high 
coefficient, after instrumenting this potentially endogenous variable. For 
the baseline specification, in addition to income, the most robust variables 
were female household head (negative effect), the dependency ratio by 
income (negative) and, to a lesser extent, the age of the household head 
(positive but decreasing).  
 
However, while robust to sample changes, some variables appeared to be 
fragile to the inclusion of income on the right-hand side, to the extent that 
they revert their sign while remaining statistically significant. For 
example, secondary and tertiary education were negative when 
controlling for current income and positive when income was 
instrumented or just deleted. Similarly, the overall dependency ratio 
positive in the former case (controlling for current income) and negative in 
the latter (income instrumented or excluded). The old dependency ratio, 
which is mostly positive and significant, ceases to be significant when 
income is instrument by asset ownership.   
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Among the additional variables tested in our exercises, government 
transfers, remittances, self-employment, capitalization pension systems, 
access to financial services, urban location, and health and education 
expenses seem to diminish saving, whereas labor formality and 
homeownership have the opposite effect. 
 
Our work provides some useful lessons in connection with the level of 
household saving and the design of public policies in this field. One 
natural question is whether one may be able to pass any verdict on the 
adequacy of saving based on the paper’s findings. Saving adequacy, of 
course, can be approached from two different –and not necessarily 
consistent- angles: the macro (how much saving do we need to sustain a 
certain economic growth rate?) and the micro (how much saving do 
households need to smooth their consumption across time and states of 
nature?). If anything, our analysis deals with the latter aspect. 
 
Saving statistics and regressions like the ones presented in this document 
do not inform per se about optimality and constraints in the saving 
decision process. Much could be learned in this direction by polling 
households firsthand about their views and perceptions as well as by 
using structural models to quantify saving and investment needs for 
sustainable growth or household-based models to forecast saving needs, 
based on household composition, life expectancy, risks and access to 
credit, among other factors. At any rate, our analysis can be used as an 
input in that diagnosis but not as the ultimate tool to evaluate saving 
optimality. 
 
Nevertheless, it should not escape us that, unlike borrowing, saving 
decisions face no major constraints: a household may find it hard to obtain 
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a loan, but nobody can prevent such household from putting aside money 
for future consumption.22  At most, surplus households may be unable to 
find instruments in which to save, provided they refuse to save in cash 
and look for bank or capital market instruments. At first glance, this seems 
a minor problem, with little impact on aggregate saving: for one, bank 
facilities do typically exist in high income, and thus high saving, areas. In 
any case, the availability of such instruments is endogenous: if there is a 
critical mass of saving to be intermediated, financial businesses will be 
established nearby those locations to take and manage cash deposits.  
 
Just to be clear, we do not claim that observed household saving rates are 
optimal in that they are high enough to meet the consumption smoothing 
goal for each and every household. Instead, we contend that households 
are already choosing the saving level that maximizes their utility, given 
the economic, social, demographic and institutional environment they 
face.23 
   
What if authorities assess that household saving is low from either a micro 
or  macro point of view? Is there any room for public policies in light of 
our results? The answer is disheartening here. Most explanatory variables 
are beyond the realm of government control (as household characteristics 
including the number of dependents, the gender of the head, and 
                                                 
22 It is true, at any rate, that some individuals display behavioral biases leading them to 
save too little. Financial education may help in this regard, but a major impact on 
aggregate saving is unlikely to result from these initiatives. If household behavior is 
difficult to be modified, one needs to take it as an additional hard constraint in the 
determination of the saving rate. 
23 Some households may exhibit myopia or other bounded rationality traits, leading them 
not to save enough for the future. But the way they process information and make 
decisions is another hard constraint to be internalized in evaluating the optimality of 
saving. In fact, the departure from full intertemporal utility maximization is the ultimate 
reason why social security is compulsory and not voluntary. 
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household location) or may be affected by state policies only in the long-
run (such as education, labor formality, the generosity of government 
transfers, and the structure of the pension system). The central role of 
income suggests that economic growth is likely to deliver much more 
fruitful and fast effects on saving rates than any government 
intervention.24 Moreover, even if the government may reshape directly or 
indirectly some factors driving saving decisions, it is important to take 
note that saving promotion may be a legitimate macro or micro policy 
goal, pro-saving measures may entail trade-offs. For example, limiting 
access to financial instruments just to promote saving would be a 
thoroughly misguided advice. In general, changing the incentive structure 
of the private sector to encourage more saving may as well change other 
household decisions (labor, education, fertility),  with indeterminate 
overall effects on social well-being. In any case, pursuing a more 
aggressive policy to enhance labor formality and social security inclusion 
seems at first glance a pro-saving policy without visible negative side 
effects.  
 
Last but not least, if governments aim to increase aggregate saving, a 
targeted policy is strongly recommended. According to our data, all 
saving is generated by the highest income quintile. Saving policies 
directed to increase the saving rate of lower income households may have 
beneficial micro effects but little to none macro effects. 
 
                                                 
24 These conclusions are akin to those found in macroeconomic saving studies, which 
assert that little can do authorities to modify private saving decisions and thus that the 
most effective pro-saving tool is the promotion of government saving (due to partial 
Ricardian Equivalence) and, se.condly, that saving is caused by economic growth, and 
not the other way around. 
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Table 2.2 
Saving Rate (Saving to Income) in Latin America 
 
 
  
Country Year Aggregate Mean Median
% of households 
with negative 
saving
2004 10.3 -25.0 8.5 44.2
2012 15.5 -12.8 16.4 38.6
2003 14.9 -16.4 5.4 45.4
2009 20.3 -3.1 14.6 36.7
1997 -0.9 -216.9 -9.7 55.9
2003 6.3 -34.0 3.1 47.5
2011 12.7 -33.3 5.2 46.4
2000 16.5 -28.5 61.0 13.2
2006 23.4 -17.1 17.0 38.5
2011 12.0 -80.2 -7.3 55.4
1999 62.7 -42.8 61.2 14.8
2006 7.2 -15.1 1.7 47.5
1998 3.5 -257.0 -26.2 60.4
2004 -32.7 -189.1 -57.4 65.2
2010 28.9 4.7 30.6 31.7
1997 12.7 -169.4 0.8 49.5
2003 14.1 -154.8 4.7 46.9
2008 18.3 -45.2 10.6 42.3
1997 9.1 -37.2 -4.0 53.0
2003 21.9 -6.2 2.5 47.4
2010 23.7 1.2 11.6 37.1
1994 8.0 -28.5 2.2 47.1
2000 3.5 -26.5 0.5 49.3
2010 3.6 -33.0 0.5 49.8
1998 4.4 -83.1 -12.6 58.7
2005 16.1 -264.6 5.6 45.8
2009 17.5 -47.1 7.7 44.5
Panama
Peru
Mexico
Nicaragua
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Guatemala
Ecuador
El Salvador
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Table 2.3 
Saving Rate (Saving to Consumption) in Latin America 
 
 
  
Country Year Aggregate Mean Median
% of households 
with negative 
saving
2004 11.5 31.1 8.8 44.2
2012 18.3 47.9 19.4 38.6
2003 17.5 22.5 5.7 45.4
2009 25.5 34.4 17.2 36.7
1997 -0.9 16.7 -8.8 55.9
2003 6.7 18.4 3.0 47.5
2011 14.5 20.7 5.3 46.4
2000 19.8 262.5 156.1 13.2
2006 30.6 44.7 20.5 38.5
2011 13.6 9.8 -6.9 55.4
1999 168.1 231.2 157.9 14.8
2006 7.7 14.3 1.7 47.5
1998 3.7 448.3 -23.5 60.4
2004 -24.7 36.7 -37.4 65.2
2010 40.6 101.5 44.0 31.7
1997 14.5 14.6 0.6 49.5
2003 16.4 17.8 4.7 46.9
2008 22.4 28.5 11.3 42.3
1997 10.0 9.0 -3.9 53.0
2003 28.1 15.7 2.5 47.4
2010 31.0 26.8 13.1 37.1
1994 8.7 7.6 2.0 47.1
2000 3.6 5.7 0.4 49.3
2010 3.7 10.1 0.2 49.8
1998 4.6 10.5 -11.3 58.7
2005 19.2 24.0 5.9 45.8
2009 21.2 24.9 8.3 44.5
Panama
Peru
Mexico
Nicaragua
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Guatemala
Ecuador
El Salvador
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Table 2.4 
Saving Rate  
(Saving to Income, including durables, health and education)  
in Latin America 
 
 
  
Country Year Aggregate Mean Median
% of households 
with negative 
saving
2004 25.5 -7.0 21.7 33.1
2012 28.4 3.4 28.8 29.5
2003 28.1 -0.6 18.7 34.0
2009 32.8 12.1 27.8 25.6
1997 23.3 -162.5 15.8 39.0
2003 16.2 -21.5 11.9 40.2
2011 22.4 -20.8 13.3 39.2
2000 25.9 -12.1 65.8 10.2
2006 33.2 -5.0 27.1 31.0
2011 22.5 -64.3 2.5 48.2
1999 70.2 -13.4 70.4 11.2
2006 61.3 -3.1 11.0 34.1
1998 25.3 -161.3 6.9 48.5
2004 -19.9 -165.1 -43.5 61.9
2010 40.2 18.0 43.0 25.4
1997 40.5 -97.0 29.0 34.1
2003 42.3 -97.6 28.0 33.1
2008 37.4 -16.0 28.8 28.4
1997 14.9 -29.3 1.7 48.8
2003 32.8 5.8 13.8 34.7
2010 35.0 13.4 22.6 25.7
1994 26.9 -2.6 19.5 27.0
2000 23.5 -0.0 19.7 26.9
2010 21.2 -9.0 16.4 35.1
1998 19.2 -60.4 1.9 49.3
2005 30.3 -192.9 18.9 34.5
2009 32.4 -22.2 22.2 33.1
Panama
Peru
Mexico
Nicaragua
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Guatemala
Ecuador
El Salvador
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Table 2.5 
Saving Rate  
(Saving to Consumption, including durables, health and education)  
in Latin America 
 
 
 
  
Country Year Aggregate Mean Median
% of households 
with negative 
saving
2004 28.4 44.6 23.5 33.1
2012 33.6 61.1 34.3 29.5
2003 33.0 36.3 19.9 34.0
2009 41.1 49.3 32.6 25.6
1997 23.1 38.8 14.2 39.0
2003 17.3 27.0 11.7 40.2
2011 25.6 28.9 13.7 39.2
2000 31.1 275.0 167.2 10.2
2006 43.4 55.9 32.7 31.0
2011 25.6 19.1 2.3 48.2
1999 188.2 252.4 182.0 11.2
2006 66.0 23.5 11.4 34.1
1998 26.3 464.3 2.3 48.5
2004 -15.0 50.5 -28.5 61.9
2010 56.5 119.4 62.2 25.4
1997 46.3 41.1 27.4 34.1
2003 49.3 42.5 29.5 33.1
2008 45.7 48.4 30.7 28.4
1997 16.3 14.4 1.6 48.8
2003 42.0 26.7 14.2 34.7
2010 45.8 39.2 25.5 25.7
1994 29.2 26.2 20.0 27.0
2000 24.3 25.4 19.5 26.9
2010 21.9 25.8 16.0 35.1
1998 20.0 23.2 1.5 49.3
2005 36.1 39.0 20.2 34.5
2009 39.2 41.3 24.0 33.1
Panama
Peru
Mexico
Nicaragua
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Guatemala
Ecuador
El Salvador
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Table 2.6 
Aggregate Saving Rate in Latin America:  
Summary Table across Countries and Surveys  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 
Household Saving Rate in Latin America:  
Household Surveys versus National Accounts 
 
 
 
  
Statistics/Saving 
Measure
Saving / 
Income
Saving/Income, 
including Durables, 
Education and Health
Saving / 
Consumption
Saving/Consumption, 
including Durables, 
Education and Health
Mean 13.1 29.3 19.8 38.5
Median 12.7 28.1 14.5 33.0
Standard Deviation 15.1 15.7 32.2 33.7
Max 62.7 70.2 168.1 188.2
Min -32.7 -19.9 -24.7 -15.0
Household 
Survey 
National 
Accounts
2003 14.9 5.6
2009 20.3 4.5
2003 6.3 6.4
2011 12.7 6.6
Ecuador 2006 14.2 5.7
Guatemala 2011 11.9 4.4
2000 3.5 9.2
2010 3.6 7.4
Aggregate Saving Rate 
Brazil 
Colombia
Mexico
Country Year
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Table 2.8 
Annual Per Capita Consumption in Latin America:  
Household Surveys versus National Accounts (in US$) 
 
 
  
Country Year
Household 
Survey
National 
Accounts
Difference (%)
2003 1,487 1,882 -21%
2009 3,653 5,117 -29%
2003 1,097 1,554 -29%
2011 3,100 4,363 -29%
Ecuador 2006 1,606 2,202 -27%
El Salvador 2010 1,189 3,200 -63%
Guatemala 2011 1,390 2,765 -50%
2000 2,068 4,480 -54%
2010 2,529 5,980 -58%
Nicaragua 2009 682 1,170 -42%
Panama 2008 3,136 3,417 -8%
2003 724 1,609 -55%
2010 1,451 3,249 -55%
Brazil 
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
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Table 2.9 
Age-Income Profiles and Median Saving Rates  
in Latin America 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Age group Total Sample
First Income 
Quintile
Second Third Fourth Fifth
21-25 3.6 -36.1 -8.1 3.7 14.1 20.3
26-30 7.8 -42.2 -9.1 6.8 14.7 21.1
31-35 9.6 -45.8 -8.0 5.9 14.4 22.5
36-40 9.9 -50.2 -10.3 3.3 15.2 24.4
41-45 11.0 -49.5 -9.9 6.6 14.6 24.6
46-50 13.2 -75.8 -12.5 5.3 16.5 25.8
51-55 13.2 -73.1 -12.6 5.3 15.7 22.4
56-60 13.5 -110.5 -27.8 4.7 14.4 27.0
61-65 12.5 -126.4 -16.2 3.1 14.2 27.1
65-70 12.9 -91.7 -42.6 11.6 11.7 26.0
71-75 15.2 -119.4 -27.0 8.9 18.5 27.8
75-80 16.6 -153.8 -30.0 12.8 20.2 22.7
Total (21-80) 9.0 -47.3 -9.8 5.4 14.8 23.4
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Table 2.10 
Age-Education Profiles and Median Saving Rates  
in Latin America 
 
 
Note: Education =1, primary schooling (complete or not), Education =2, secondary schooling 
(complete or not), Education =3, tertiary schooling (complete or not). 
 
  
Age group Total Sample Education = 1 Education = 2 Education = 3
21-25 3.6 5.1 3.5 2.5
26-30 7.8 6.8 7.9 8.7
31-35 9.6 6.1 9.8 12.9
36-40 9.9 7.2 9.9 17.1
41-45 11.0 6.9 11.2 15.1
46-50 13.2 9.6 13.3 24.0
51-55 13.2 5.2 14.3 19.5
56-60 13.5 4.1 14.0 24.9
61-65 12.5 2.2 15.2 16.3
65-70 12.9 5.1 14.6 23.5
71-75 15.2 0.3 20.1 20.8
75-80 16.6 9.5 22.7 16.6
Total (21-80) 9.0 6.1 9.1 11.9
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Table 2.11 
Age-Expenditure Profiles and Median Saving Rates  
in Latin America 
 
 
 
 
Age group Total Sample
First 
Expenditure 
Quintile
Second Third Fourth Fifth
21-25 3.6 21.0 9.7 2.5 -1.8 -9.8
26-30 7.8 22.9 12.7 7.6 5.9 -1.5
31-35 9.6 22.9 11.2 10.1 7.3 3.2
36-40 9.9 22.3 11.8 7.6 8.4 6.5
41-45 11.0 24.3 15.3 9.2 7.5 5.3
46-50 13.2 25.0 14.9 9.7 8.7 11.8
51-55 13.2 23.4 16.0 8.6 11.1 9.0
56-60 13.5 22.4 13.6 9.4 3.1 15.3
61-65 12.5 19.2 12.2 6.4 13.0 -2.4
65-70 12.9 28.4 2.4 2.8 -1.1 -0.2
71-75 15.2 26.7 8.8 3.6 8.2 -18.0
75-80 16.6 36.9 3.2 -4.3 -11.5 -3.1
Total (21-80) 9.0 23.5 12.0 7.3 5.3 1.1
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Table 3.1 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries and Surveys 
 
 
  
HH Head Age 0.0068*** 0.0062*** -0.0011** 0.0077*** 0.0074*** 0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Squared HH Head Age -0.0001*** -0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0618*** -0.0604*** -0.0441*** -0.0539*** -0.0502*** -0.0462***
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0027)
Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0182*** -0.0560***
(0.0013) (0.0014)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) 0.0139*** -0.0802***
(0.0015) (0.0016)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0150*** 0.0160***
(0.0034) (0.0037)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.2837*** -0.3143***
(0.0037) (0.0038)
8-13 years education, HH Head -0.0693*** -0.0688*** -0.0591*** 0.0661*** 0.0593*** 0.0678***
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0029)
>13 years education, HH Head -0.1552*** -0.1520*** -0.1082*** 0.1241*** 0.1149*** 0.1423***
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0038)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.1945*** 0.1904*** 0.1780***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Constant -1.0179*** -0.9878*** -0.5837*** -0.0535*** -0.0153 0.2308***
(0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0126) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0124)
Observations 392,263 384,777 292,318 392,281 384,795 292,320
Regressions span a maximum of 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(6)Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Table 3.2 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries, Last Available Survey Only 
 
 
  
HH Head Age 0.00707*** 0.00575*** -0.00232*** 0.00945*** 0.00928*** 0.00594***
(0.000484) (0.000508) (0.000624) (0.000495) (0.000546) (0.000656)
Square HH Head Age -7.18e-05*** -5.09e-05*** 1.29e-05** -5.16e-05*** -5.86e-05*** -2.13e-05***
(4.65e-06) (5.04e-06) (6.19e-06) (4.76e-06) (5.41e-06) (6.52e-06)
Female HH Head -0.0647*** -0.0653*** -0.0281*** -0.0671*** -0.0620*** -0.0555***
(0.00299) (0.00307) (0.00374) (0.00306) (0.00330) (0.00394)
Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0719*** -0.0507***
(0.00206) (0.00201)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) 0.0855*** -0.0771***
(0.00246) (0.00249)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0221*** 0.0263***
(0.00481) (0.00517)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.235*** -0.267***
(0.00546) (0.00574)
8-13 years education, HH Head -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.165*** 0.0441*** 0.0380*** 0.0413***
(0.00351) (0.00358) (0.00414) (0.00342) (0.00367) (0.00415)
>13 years education, HH Head -0.328*** -0.330*** -0.321*** 0.105*** 0.0935*** 0.118***
(0.00491) (0.00502) (0.00594) (0.00448) (0.00481) (0.00557)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.320*** 0.322*** 0.328***
(0.00162) (0.00169) (0.00198)
Constant -1.572*** -1.572*** -1.184*** -0.174*** -0.136*** -3.10e-05
(0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0182) (0.0135) (0.0146) (0.0178)
Observations 167,247 164,691 121,272 167,247 164,691 121,272
Regressions span 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(4) (6)(1) (2) (3) (5)Variables
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Table 3.3 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries, Excluding Outliers  
 
 
HH Head Age 0.0067*** 0.0053*** -0.0034*** 0.0080*** 0.0077*** 0.0032***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Squared HH Head Age -0.0001*** -0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0643*** -0.0637*** -0.0356*** -0.0557*** -0.0523*** -0.0463***
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0027)
Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0568*** -0.0540***
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) 0.0625*** -0.0791***
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0165*** 0.0180***
(0.0034) (0.0036)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.2751*** -0.3202***
(0.0035) (0.0038)
8-13 years education, HH Head -0.1341*** -0.1343*** -0.1377*** 0.0677*** 0.0602*** 0.0690***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0028)
>13 years education, HH Head -0.2942*** -0.2926*** -0.2753*** 0.1272*** 0.1180*** 0.1463***
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0038)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.2917*** 0.2904*** 0.2943***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011)
Constant -1.3943*** -1.3727*** -0.9406*** -0.1411*** -0.0997*** 0.1428***
(0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0121) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0123)
Observations 384,707 377,644 286,732 384,723 377,660 286,734
Regressions span a maximum of 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(5)(4) (6)Variables (1) (2) (3)
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Table 3.4 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
Data for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru 
 
  
  
HH Head Age 0.0075*** 0.0053*** -0.0026*** 0.0084*** 0.0074*** 0.0039***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Squared HH Head Age -0.0001*** -0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0625*** -0.0614*** -0.0332*** -0.0608*** -0.0559*** -0.0478***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0030)
Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0645*** -0.0359***
(0.0015) (0.0016)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) 0.0729*** -0.0581***
(0.0018) (0.0018)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0104*** 0.0131***
(0.0036) (0.0038)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.2141*** -0.2444***
(0.0040) (0.0042)
8-13 years education, HH Head -0.1305*** -0.1315*** -0.1321*** 0.0485*** 0.0419*** 0.0446***
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0031)
>13 years education, HH Head -0.2749*** -0.2740*** -0.2522*** 0.0999*** 0.0915*** 0.1099***
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0040)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.2545*** 0.2537*** 0.2500***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Constant -1.3147*** -1.2869*** -0.8637*** -0.1609*** -0.1173*** 0.0461***
(0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0141)
Observations 266,314 262,754 196,534 266,329 262,769 196,536
Regressions span a maximum of 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 3.5 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Consumption) 
All Countries and Surveys 
 
 
  
HH Head Age 0.7206*** 0.5886*** -0.1374*** 0.8332*** 0.7745*** 0.2782***
(0.0345) (0.0369) (0.0393) (0.0404) (0.0416) (0.0452)
Squared HH Head Age -0.0061*** -0.0042*** 0.0014*** -0.0042*** -0.0042*** 0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Female HH Head -7.2833*** -7.2116*** -4.5800*** -5.8446*** -5.3257*** -4.7588***
(0.2183) (0.2271) (0.2424) (0.2562) (0.2561) (0.2790)
Dependency Ratio (by age) 4.6312*** -5.3038***
(0.1342) (0.1539)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) 5.0361*** -7.3140***
(0.1574) (0.1724)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 1.1883*** 1.6317***
(0.3578) (0.4040)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -24.7491*** -32.6178***
(0.3448) (0.3957)
8-13 years education, HH Head -10.7476*** -10.9347*** -11.1135*** 7.2497*** 6.5895*** 7.1434***
(0.2510) (0.2590) (0.2632) (0.2878) (0.2855) (0.2949)
>13 years education, HH Head -22.5170*** -22.6888*** -20.3393*** 14.3954*** 13.5055*** 15.8093***
(0.3370) (0.3478) (0.3607) (0.3737) (0.3710) (0.3926)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 26.2332*** 26.2707*** 25.5163***
(0.0741) (0.0775) (0.0789)
Constant -123.2417*** -121.7798*** -80.4093*** -6.9888*** -2.8812** 24.9647***
(1.0384) (1.0872) (1.1697) (1.1409) (1.1432) (1.2792)
Observations 392,078 384,620 292,194 393,859 386,240 292,222
Regressions span a maximum of 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 3.6 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income)  
Health and Education Expenses as Saving  
All Countries and Surveys 
 
 
HH Head Age 0.0053*** 0.0045*** -0.0011*** 0.0058*** 0.0054*** 0.0025***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Squared HH Head Age -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0509*** -0.0499*** -0.0336*** -0.0431*** -0.0404*** -0.0364***
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0024)
Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0198*** -0.0451***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) 0.0176*** -0.0641***
(0.0014) (0.0013)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0103*** 0.0095***
(0.0031) (0.0031)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.2486*** -0.2779***
(0.0032) (0.0034)
8-13 years education, HH Head -0.0498*** -0.0494*** -0.0445*** 0.0700*** 0.0652*** 0.0725***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025)
>13 years education, HH Head -0.1057*** -0.1022*** -0.0682*** 0.1443*** 0.1378*** 0.1631***
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0033)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.1738*** 0.1704*** 0.1649***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Constant -0.7339*** -0.7048*** -0.4072*** 0.1330*** 0.1636*** 0.3420***
(0.0089) (0.0094) (0.0110) (0.0088) (0.0087) (0.0109)
Observations 392,257 384,771 292,313 392,275 384,789 292,315
Regressions span a maximum of 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(4) (5) (6)Variables (1) (2) (3)
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Table 3.7 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries and Surveys 
IV (HH Education) Estimation  
 
 
HH Head Age 0.0065*** 0.0060*** 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Square HH Head Age -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0508*** -0.0496*** -0.0358***
(0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0035)
Dependency Ratio (by age) -0.0254***
(0.0017)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) -0.0418***
(0.0027)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0092***
(0.0004)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.2881***
(0.0028)
IV - Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) [▪] 0.0875*** 0.0826*** 0.0940***
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0019)
Constant -0.5879*** -0.5384*** -0.3086***
(0.0112) (0.0084) (0.0188)
Observations 434,158 423,887 326,226
Hausman test
Chi2 1598.64 170.19 -11.62
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0088
Variables (1) (2) (3)
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Table 3.8 
Baseline Median Regressions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries and Surveys 
IV (Home and Car Ownership) Estimation 
 
 
HH Head Age 0.0071*** 0.0059*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Square HH Head Age -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0501*** -0.0480*** -0.0371***
(0.0025) (0.0043) (0.0027)
Dependency Ratio (by age) -0.0396***
(0.0020)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) -0.0586***
(0.0025)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) -0.0028
(0.0033)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.3841***
(0.0056)
8-13 years education, HH Head 0.0398*** 0.0353*** 0.0304***
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0007)
>13 years education, HH Head 0.0597*** 0.0570*** 0.0690***
(0.0059) (0.0078) (0.0047)
IV - Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) [▪] 0.0630*** 0.0581*** 0.0688***
(0.0027) (0.0057) (0.0058)
Constant -0.4862*** -0.4178*** -0.1179***
(0.0146) (0.0279) (0.0365)
Observations 265,677 255,651 211,189
Hausman test
Chi2 2906.53 -294.46 -1145.44
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Regressions span a maximum of 10 countries and 27 household surveys. 
Estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Bootstrapped standard errors  in second stage, with 1,000 replications.
Variables (1) (2) (3)
[▪] Instrumented by homeowner and the household own a car
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Table 3.9 (a) 
Median Regressions with Additional Regressors 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries and Surveys 
 
 
  
HH Head Age -0.0012** -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Squared HH Head Age 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0638*** -0.0475*** -0.0650*** -0.0649*** -0.0631*** -0.0478***
(0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0026)
8-13 years education, HH Head -0.0418*** 0.0026 -0.0240*** -0.0237*** -0.0244*** -0.0662***
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0048) (0.0028)
>13 years education, HH Head -0.0713*** 0.0318*** -0.0408*** -0.0401*** -0.0368*** -0.1173***
(0.0047) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0038)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.4115*** -0.3812*** -0.4067*** -0.4052*** -0.4058*** -0.2806***
(0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0036)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.1396*** 0.1285*** 0.1257*** 0.1262*** 0.1236*** 0.1773***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0008)
Gov transfers (% HH income) -1.0903***
(0.0186)
Remittances (% HH income)) -0.3101***
(0.0013)
Formal HH Head (legal) 0.0949*** 0.1118*** 0.1184***
(0.0046) (0.0054) (0.0060)
Formal Head * Full capitalization -0.0477*** -0.0666***
(0.0084) (0.0095)
Full Capitalization 0.0813***
(0.0102)
Self-Employed HH Head -0.1928***
(0.0068)
Constant -0.3040*** -0.7740*** -0.4223*** -0.4279*** -0.4121*** -0.5860***
(0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0210) (0.0123)
Observations 200,789 151,771 134,920 134,920 134,920 292,318
Regressions span 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(6)Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Table 3.9 (b) 
Median Regressions with Additional Regressors 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries and Surveys  
 
 
  
HH Head Age -0.0016** -0.0015* 0.0011* -0.0021*** -0.0008 0.0053***
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Squared HH Head Age 0.0000*** 0.0000* 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female HH Head -0.0434*** -0.0144*** -0.0511*** -0.0424*** -0.0503*** -0.0423***
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0034)
8-13 years education, HH Head 0.0343*** -0.0933*** 0.0076* -0.0547*** -0.0185*** -0.0040
(0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0036)
>13 years education, HH Head 0.0780*** -0.1322*** 0.0402*** -0.1019*** -0.0523*** 0.0195***
(0.0072) (0.0085) (0.0059) (0.0036) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -0.2970*** -0.0995*** -0.3014*** -0.2853*** -0.3752*** -0.3703***
(0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0058) (0.0035) (0.0045) (0.0050)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.0891*** 0.2585*** 0.0995*** 0.1743*** 0.1653*** 0.3041***
(0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0015)
Has a Loan -0.1430***
(0.0062)
Holds a bank account -0.3553***
(0.0139)
Has a credit card or loan -0.1331***
(0.0063)
Homeowner 0.0351***
(0.0024)
Urban -0.0633***
(0.0032)
Health expenses (log USD PPP2005) -0.0912***
(0.0009)
Educ. expenses (log USD PPP2005) -0.0811***
(0.0009)
Constant -0.0597*** -1.1930*** -0.3713*** -0.5631*** -0.4374*** -1.2078***
(0.0213) (0.0247) (0.0182) (0.0118) (0.0149) (0.0185)
Observations 76,797 60,247 103,724 285,881 216,915 135,793
Regressions span 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Variables (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
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Table 3.10 
Median Regressions with Income Interactions 
Household Saving Rate (Saving/Income) 
All Countries and Surveys 
 
 
HH Head Age 0.00803*** 0.00689*** 0.00601*** -0.00153*** 0.00641***
(0.000393) (0.000335) (0.000353) (0.000420) (0.000347)
HH Head Age* Log (pc Income) -0.000370***
(3.84e-05)
Square HH Head Age -4.47e-05*** -5.61e-05*** -4.33e-05*** 2.03e-05*** -4.85e-05***
(3.50e-06) (3.25e-06) (3.55e-06) (4.18e-06) (3.49e-06)
Female HH Head -0.0606*** -0.0608*** -0.0609*** -0.0460*** -0.0615***
(0.00214) (0.00212) (0.00217) (0.00259) (0.00213)
Dependency Ratio (by age) -0.114***
(0.00381)
Dependency Ratio (by age)* Log (pc Income) 0.0267***
(0.000739)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age) 0.0150*** -0.159*** 0.0158***
(0.00148) (0.00409) (0.00148)
Young Dependency  Ratio (by age)* Log (pc Income) 0.0361***
(0.000808)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age) 0.0147*** -0.0428*** 0.0154***
(0.00337) (0.0107) (0.00336)
Old Dependency Ratio (by age)* Log (pc Income) 0.0102***
(0.00186)
Dependency Ratio (by income) -1.208***
(0.0124)
Dependency Ratio (by income)* Log (pc Income) 0.178***
(0.00234)
8-13 years of education, HH Head -0.0692*** -0.0715*** -0.0717*** -0.0614*** -0.0291***
(0.00244) (0.00244) (0.00248) (0.00281) (0.00844)
8-13 years of education, HH Head *  Log (pc Income) -0.00805***
(0.00150)
> 13 years of education, HH Head -0.153*** -0.156*** -0.153*** -0.117*** 0.163***
(0.00328) (0.00328) (0.00333) (0.00385) (0.0115)
> 13 years of education, HH Head * Log (pc Income) -0.0519***
(0.00181)
Log pc HH Income (USD PPP2005) 0.208*** 0.181*** 0.175*** 0.0732*** 0.203***
(0.00194) (0.000895) (0.000918) (0.00167) (0.000865)
Constant -1.081*** -0.940*** -0.903*** -0.0141 -1.065***
(0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0147) (0.0106)
Observations 384,777 392,263 384,777 292,318 384,777
The estimation includes unreported country and time dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions span 10 LA countries and 27 household surveys (see text for further details on sample composition). 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
